Pablo Sar
Working on ethics as a way of making things better
Working on ethics as a way of making things better
Hi! I’m Pablo Sar. I work in ethics, and what has always drawn me most to it is its practical dimension: the possibility of thinking carefully about difficult moral problems and how our decisions can help reduce suffering in the world. I’m especially interested in cases where uncertainty about sentience makes moral decision-making especially challenging.
My academic background is in Philosophy and History, and I later completed the MSt in Practical Ethics at the University of Oxford. I’m currently doing a PhD in AI ethics at the University of Santiago de Compostela, where I’m part of the Episteme Research Group. I also co-founded and co-organise Minding Machine Minds, an international seminar on digital sentience and its philosophical and ethical implications.
Outside philosophy, I love cinema, geography, and doing sport, usually in that order, although it can vary depending on the time of year.
Feel free to contact me by email. You can also find me on PhilPapers, Google Scholar and Research Gate. My CV is available here.
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Episteme Research Group group at the University of Santiago de Compostela, founded in 2006 and based in the Department of Philosophy and Anthropology.
Co-founder and co-organiser · 2025–present
An international seminar and reading group on digital sentience, AI welfare, and the philosophical and ethical questions raised by artificial minds. The project brings together early-career researchers working across philosophy of mind, ethics, AI governance, and technical AI research.
Collaborator · 2025–present
A structured resource that maps key arguments for and against computational functionalism in consciousness studies, with special attention to digital consciousness and digital sentience.
Largoplacismo sin especismo ni sustratismo (2026)
Revista de Bioética y Derecho
With Iria Murado-Carballo
We argue that longtermism is best understood as a thesis of temporal non-exclusion: if future states of affairs may contain value or disvalue, their temporal distance alone cannot exclude them from moral consideration. We then contend that, for the same reason, neither species membership nor biological substrate can by themselves limit longtermist concern, whose proper object is the full range of future states of affairs that may be better or worse for individuals or entities capable of being benefited or harmed.
"AI and Animals" · Guest lecture, Universidad del Museo Social Argentino (UMSA), Buenos Aires, Argentina · 23 June 2026
"The case for New World Screwworm eradication" · Rethink Priorities Strategic Animal Webinars · Online · 2 Jul 2026
"Longtermism: An Egalitarian Approach" · Conference on Suffering-Focused Ethics · 12 Jul 2021
Los que no aplauden: víctimas invisibilizadas por los macrofestivales
elDiario.es · 2025
An essay on the often overlooked harms that large music festivals can cause to wild animals through noise, artificial light, fireworks, habitat disruption, and waste.